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I.  LEGAL MARIJUANA USE IS HEATING UP 
As you read this, citizens of both Colorado and Washington are smoking 
legalized recreational marijuana.1  Cannabis tourists are flocking to these 
states as well because the legalization of recreational marijuana has 
spawned a cottage industry of marijuana tourism, which has blossomed in 
both states.2  This holds true especially for Colorado with its already sig-
nificant tourism industry based around its skiing industry.3  Legal recrea-
tional marijuana has been embraced by citizens of Washington and Colo-
rado, and greeted by marijuana enthusiasts widely as a harbinger of 
changing national sentiment toward marijuana.4   
State lawmakers, however, have wrestled with how this new resource can 
be taxed and monetized to generate revenue for the state.  This debate issue 
is already critical in Washington, as the recreational marijuana industry has 
already been deemed a “tourist novelty” due to the onerous taxes regula-
tions.5  This article discusses the tax schemes of newly legal recreational 
marijuana in both Colorado and Washington and how these taxes are simi-
lar to other taxes the state levies. This article then examines the policies be-
hind the taxation of marijuana, including competing theories of taxation. 
Finally, this article concludes that while both states succeed in generating 
revenue, the taxing scheme employed fails to optimize revenue, creating 
deadweight loss for both the state economy and the recreational marijuana 
market. 
																																																													
1 See Ricardo Baca, $573 Million in Pot Sales: Here are 12 Stats that Define the Year in Marijuana, 
THE CANNABIST, Dec. 26, 2014, http://www.thecannabist.co/2014/12/26/pot-sales-taxes-statistics/26031 
(describing that 485,000 citizens of Colorado use marijuana regularly, with 111,550 smoking marijuana 
on a daily basis).   
2 Kevin Fixler, Pot Tourism: How to Buy Marijuana in Colorado, FODOR’S TRAVEL, Mar. 26, 2014, 
http://www.fodors.com/news/pot-tourism-how-to-buy-marijuana-in-colorado-10403.html; Anna Maria 
Stephens, Pot Tourism: How to Buy Marijuana in Washington State, FODOR’S TRAVEL, Sept. 25, 2014, 
http://www.fodors.com/news/pot-tourism-how-to-buy-marijuana-in-washington-state-10842.html.  
3 Baca, supra note 1. 
4 See Bill Chappell, Marijuana Votes: Oregon and D.C. Legalize; Florida Says No to Medical, NPR, 
Nov. 4, 2014, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/11/04/361533318/marijuana-on-the-ballot-d-
c-voters-ok-legalization (detailing how in November 2014 ballot initiatives in Alaska, Oregon, and 
Washington, D.C. all voted to legalize recreational marijuana).  
5 Lawrence Downes, Op-Ed., The Great Colorado Weed Experiment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2014, at 
SR10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/03/opinion/sunday/high-time-the-great-colorado-
weed-experiment.html. 
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II.  BACKGROUND AND HISTORY LEADING TO LEGALIZATION AND 
TAXATION OF RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA  
Understanding Colorado and Washington’s state taxing schemes and his-
tory with marijuana is necessary to evaluating and understanding how Colo-
rado and Washington arrived at legalized recreational marijuana and the at-
tendant taxing schemes each state chose for marijuana.  To that end, this 
section analyzes both Colorado and Washington’s greater sales tax regime, 
any history the state has with legalizing marijuana, how marijuana is taxed, 
and what the results of those taxes are.  In addition, this section looks at the 
United States’ fiscal history of dealing with drugs, and marijuana particu-
larly. 
A.  The Mile High State: Colorado and Marijuana 
Colorado imposes a state-wide sales and use tax rate of 2.9%.6  In addi-
tion to the statewide sales tax, Colorado employs a “Home Rule” system, 
allowing each city and county to impose its own municipal sales taxes.7  
Consequently, sales tax rates in Colorado vary from 2.9% up to 10.4%.8  
This tax must be separately stated on a patron’s receipt9 and may not be ab-
sorbed or refunded by the retailer.10 
Colorado first legalized medical marijuana in 2000 through an amend-
ment to the state constitution approved by 54% of voters.11  This amend-
ment authorizes marijuana consumption for individuals a doctor determines 
suffer from “debilitating medical condition[s].”12  While the purchase of 
marijuana is only subject to the applicable state and local sales tax, the 
businesses running medical marijuana dispensaries are subject to a $7,000 
to $15,000 application fee, $5,200 to $13,200 registration fee, and a $5,800 
																																																													
6 COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-26-106(1)(a)(II) (2015).   
7 COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-2-102(1) (2015). 
8 Sales & Lodging Tax, THE TOWN OF SNOWMASS VILLAGE, http://www.tosv.com/index.aspx?NID=141 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2015) (including the state, county, and transportation authority, the town of Snow-
mass Village, Colorado levies a total sales tax of 10.4%). 
9 COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-26-106(a) (2015). 
10 COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-26-108 (2015). 
11 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14; 
Colorado Medical Use of Marijuana, Initiative 20 (2000), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Colo 
rado_Medical_Use_of_Marijuana,_Initiative_20_(2000) (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
12 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, §14(1)(a). (Defining Debilitating Medical Conditions, which range from 
HIV and AIDS to “a chronic or debilitating disease or medical condition . . . which produces, for a spe-
cific patient . . . severe pain.”) 
 70 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST  [Vol. XIX:ii 
	
to $13,800 license renewal fee.13  The state made $7,340,000 from applica-
tion fees in the first year alone.14   
These fees are not labeled “taxes,” but they function in the same manner.  
As these fees exceed the government’s cost to regulate the industry, the ad-
ditional generated revenue accrues to the state’s general fund.15  In addition, 
there is no law prohibiting the business from passing on these costs and fees 
to the consumer, potentially shifting the incidence of the fees to the con-
sumer through a price markup.  This experience of revenue generation 
helped whet the state’s appetite for the financial possibilities of wider le-
galization. 
Multiple proposals to legalize the consumption and possession of mari-
juana were submitted to the state’s review board in order to appear on the 
2012 ballot.16  After receiving board authorization, Amendment 64 to the 
Colorado Constitution was submitted to voters as part of the November 6, 
2012, election.17  Over 55% of Colorado voters approved this amendment, 
making it the one of the first two states to legalize marijuana.18   
The amendment approved by voters laid out the state’s intentions to tax 
the new industry in order to fund its regulation, as well as requiring the first 
$40 million in revenue raised annually from the taxes to be earmarked for 
public school construction.19  Following statewide legalization, the Colo-
																																																													
13 Medical Marijuana Dispensary Laws: Fees and Taxes, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT 1 (last updated 
Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.mpp.org/issues/medical-marijuana/medical-marijuana-dispensary-laws-fees-
and-taxes/ [hereinafter Medical Marijuana Dispensary Laws]. 
14 Colorado Nets $7.34 Million From Medical Marijuana Dispensary License Applications, 
MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, http://www.mpp.org/states/colorado/co/colorado-nets-734-from.html (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
15 Medical Marijuana Dispensary Laws, supra note 13.  
16 Tim Hoover, 8 Initiatives to Legalize Pot Seek Spots on 2012 Colorado Ballot, DENV. POST (May 20, 
2011), http://www.denverpost.com/headlines/ci_18101154. 
17 Colorado Marijuana Legalization Initiative, Amendment 64 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Marijuana_Legalization_Initiative,_Amendment_64_(2012) (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Colorado Marijuana Legalization Initiative]. 
18 Sadie Gurman, Coloradans Say Yes to recreational Use of Marijuana, DENV. POST (Nov. 6, 2012), 
http://www.denverpost.com/ci_21941918/nation-watches-colorados-marijuana-legalization-vote. 
19 The proposal asked voters, “Shall there be an amendment to the Colorado constitution concerning 
marijuana, and, in connection therewith, providing for the regulation of marijuana; permitting a person 
twenty-one years of age or older to consume or possess limited amounts of marijuana; providing for the 
licensing of cultivation facilities, product manufacturing facilities, testing facilities, and retail stores; 
permitting local governments to regulate or prohibit such facilities; requiring the general assembly to 
enact an excise tax to be levied upon wholesale sales of marijuana; requiring that the first $40 million in 
revenue raised annually by such tax be credited to the public school capital construction assistance fund; 
and requiring the general assembly to enact legislation governing the cultivation, processing, and sale of 
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rado legislature approved a 15% excise tax and a 10% special sales tax to 
be levied on recreational marijuana sales, in addition to the state and local 
sales taxes.20   
The 15% excise tax is imposed on the first sale or transfer of the mari-
juana.21  The transaction subject to the excise tax may be the sale from retail 
marijuana cultivation facility to a retail marijuana store, a marijuana proc-
essing facility, or the sale to another cultivation facility.22  At the beginning 
of Colorado’s allowance of legal recreational marijuana, the state extended 
a medical marijuana law already in place requiring retailers to grow 70% of 
what they sold.23   
A retailer growing 70% of their own marijuana means that for 70% of 
their customers, the first sale or transfer comes directly with the consumer.  
This allows retailers to pay the excise tax or shift the incidence of the excise 
tax directly on consumers.24  But as that rule has been repealed for recrea-
tional marijuana retailers, the first retail sale often now comes earlier in the 
stream of commerce, between cultivators and retailers.  While this tax is 
paid by the retailer, the retailer is permitted to shift the incidence of the tax 
to the consumer through higher prices to compensate the retailer for initially 
paying the tax.  
As a result of Colorado’s “home rule” system, municipalities are allowed 
to impose their own special sales tax on marijuana sales.25  Denver residents 
approved a ballot measure allowing an additional city sales tax on mari-
juana sales of 3.5%, but that number can be increased by the city govern-
ment up to 15% without further voter approval.26  This adds up to a con-
																																																																																																																																													
industrial hemp?” Results for Proposed Initiative #30, COLO. SEC’Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.state 
.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/results/2011-2012/30Results.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2015). 
20 SARAH SCHMITT ET AL., EARLY LESSONS FROM LEGALIZED MARIJUANA: AN ANALYSIS OF 
COLORADO’S POLICY DECISIONS 9 (Colo. Health Inst. ed., 2014).  
21 Excise 23: Excise Tax on Retail Marijuana, COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE 1 (Apr. 2014), https://www 
.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/Excise23.pdf.  
22 Id.  
23 Kristen Wyatt, Colorado’s Pot Market Getting New Competition, YAHOO! NEWS, Sept. 30, 2014, 
http://news.yahoo.com/colorados-pot-market-getting-competition-201414075--finance.html. 
24 See Marijuana Taxes: Quick Answers, COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific 
/tax/marijuana-taxes-quick-answers (last visited May 1, 2015). “As a consumer of RETAIL marijuana, 
how much tax will I be charged on my purchase [?] When purchasing retail marijuana, the purchase is 
subject to the 10% state marijuana, 2.9% state sales tax and a 15% excise plus any local sales taxes.” Id. 
25 See Jeremy P. Meyer, Denver Voters Backing 3.5 Percent Tax on Pot, DENV. POST, Nov. 5, 2013, 
http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_24461037/denver-voters-weigh-3-5-percent-marijuana-
tax. 
26 Denver Additional Marijuana Sales Tax, Question 2A (November 2013), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
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sumer in Denver purchasing recreational marijuana paying: the 4.75% Den-
ver city sales tax,27 the 2.9% state sales tax, the Denver 3.5% marijuana 
sales tax, the 10% special state marijuana sales tax, and effectively bearing 
the 15% excise tax.  This results in a total tax on Denver consumers of 
36.15%.   
During the debate surrounding the potential tax scheme for recreational 
marijuana the government forecasted $70 million in additional revenue 
through the special marijuana sales and excise taxes, not including ordinary 
sales tax.28  The Colorado Center on Law & Policy released a study con-
cluding the state would generate total revenue of $47.2 million including: 
$24 million in excise tax revenue, $8.7 million in state sales tax revenue, 
and $14.5 million in local sales tax revenue through the year 2016.29  This 
revenue forecast also did not include any potential savings from legalizing 
recreational marijuana.  Colorado State University’s Colorado Futures Cen-
ter placed its total tax revenue estimate at $101.8 million.30  The actual 
revenue received was lower than projected.  For calendar year 2014, Colo-
rado collected only $44 million from the marijuana sales and excise taxes, 
grossed up to $76 million when including business licensing fees and the 
general state sales tax.31  The reason for this shortfall, and how tax policy 
																																																																																																																																													
pedia.org/City_of_Denver_Additional_Marijuana_Sales_Tax,_Question_2A_(November_2013) (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2015).  
27 Treasury Div., Denver Combined Tax Rates, DENVER DEP’T OF FIN. (last updated Nov. 21, 2014), 
http://www.denvergov.org/Portals/571/documents/Denver_Combined_Tax_Rates_2015.pdf. 
28 Abby Haglage, Colorado’s Pot Revenue Goes Up in Smoke, THE DAILY BEAST, Feb. 12, 2015, http:// 
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/12/colorado-s-pot-revenue-goes-up-in-smoke.html. 
29 CHRISTOPHER STIFFLER, COLO. CTR. ON LAW & POLICY, AMENDMENT 64 WOULD PRODUCE $60 
MILLION IN NEW REVENUE AND SAVINGS FOR COLORADO 8, 12 (2012) available at 
http://cclponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/amendment_64_analysis_final.pdf (finding that addi-
tional millions will also be saved as courts and prisons are now dealing with significantly fewer mari-
juana related arrests and proceedings). 
30 CHARLES BROWN & PHYLLIS RESNICK, COLO. FUTURES CTR., COLO. STATE UNIV., THE FISCAL 
IMPACT OF AMENDMENT 64 ON STATE REVENUES 1, 3, 6-7 (2013) available at https://webcms.colo 
state.edu/coloradofutures/media/sites/76/2015/09/Marijuana-Economic-Study-Update.pdf (predicting 
$22.1 million in excise tax revenue, $61.75 million in special sales tax revenue, $17.9 million in regular 
sales tax revenue) (assuming base assumptions regarding how many of marijuana users will transition 
from medical marijuana to recreational marijuana, annual average consumption for those individuals, the 
cost of production, and a retailer’s average markup for customers). 
31 Kristen Wyatt, Colorado Pulls in $76M in Marijuana Taxes and Business Fees for 2014, THE 
CANNABIST, Feb. 10, 2015, http://www.thecannabist.co/2015/02/10/colorado-pot-tax-44-million-
recreational-taxes-2014/29510/; See Dep’t of Revenue, Marijuana Taxes, Licenses, and Fees Transfers 
and Distribution, STATE OF COLORADO (Feb. 2015), available at https://www.colorado.gov/pacific 
/sites/default/files/1214%20Marijuana%20Tax%2C%20License%2C%20and%20Fees%20Report.pdf. 
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could be used to address this problem is addressed in greater detail in Part 
IV.32   
B.  The Evergreen State: Washington and Weed 
Washington’s statewide sales tax is 6.5%.33  Like Colorado, local mu-
nicipalities are free to impose additional local sales tax, with rates climbing 
as high as 9.6%.34  The significant number of Native American tribes in 
Washington adds complexity, as sales taking place in “Indian Country” to 
tribe members are not taxed while sales in “Indian Country” to non-tribe 
members are.35  As in Colorado, the sales tax in Washington must also be 
stated separately and is not refundable to the purchaser.36 
In 1998, Washington voters cast ballots on a measure to allow medical 
marijuana to be used by citizens suffering from “certain terminal or debili-
tating conditions.”37  Over 58% of Washington voters supported this meas-
ure, removing criminal penalties for patients covered by the proposal, and 
allowing patients to possess a sixty-day supply of marijuana.38  Confusion 
ensued over the meaning of the term “sixty-day supply.”39  Clarification did 
not come until the Washington Senate requested the Washington Depart-
ment of Health adopt rules quantifying “sixty-day supply”40 that were later 
																																																													
32 See infra Part IV.  
33 WASH. REV. CODE § 82.08.020(1) (2015). 
34 WASH. REV. CODE § 82.14.030 (2015); LOCAL SALES AND USE TAX RATES BY CITY/COUNTY, 
WASH. DEP’T OF REVENUE 3 (Apr. 14, 2015), available at http://dor.wa.gov/Docs/forms/ExcsTx/LocSal 
UseTx/LocalSlsUseFlyer_15_Q2_alpha.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). (stating that Seattle is one of 
two municipalities in Washington charging a 9.6% sales tax, levying a 3.1% municipal sales tax as part 
of the Seattle Transportation Benefit District). 
35 Retail Sales Tax, WASH. DEP’T OF REVENUE, http://dor.wa.gov/content/FindTaxesAndRates/Retail 
SalesTax (last visited Oct. 16, 2015); Indian Tax Guide, WASH. DEP’T OF REVENUE, http://dor.wa.gov 
/content/FindTaxesAndRates/RetailSalesTax/Indians/IndianTaxGuide (last visited Oct. 16, 2015). 
36 WASH. REV. CODE § 82.08.050(9) (2015); WASH. REV. CODE § 82.08.120 (2015). 
37 WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, VOTERS PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION, NOV. 3, 
1998 8 (1998), available at https://wei.sos.wa.gov/agency/osos/en/press_and_research/PreviousElec 
tions/documents/voters%27pamphlets/1998%20wa%20st.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2015). The individu-
als being covered by the Washington medical marijuana statute are similar to those covered by the Colo-
rado medical marijuana statute. See COLO. CONST. Art. XVIII, §14, supra note 11; Colorado Medical 
Use of Marijuana, Initiative 20, supra note 11; MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, supra note 13. 
38 Washington Medical Marijuana, Initiative 692 (1998), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Washing 
ton_Medical_Marijuana,_Initiative_692_(1998) (last visited Oct. 16, 2015). 
39 Sara Jean Green, State Rule Clarifies 60-Day Supply of Medical Marijuana, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 3, 
2008), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/state-rule-clarifies-60-day-supply-of-medical-mari 
juana. 
40 S. Res. 6032, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007), available at http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org 
/sourcefiles/SB6032WA.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2015). 
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codified by the state legislature.41  Although medical marijuana was now 
permissible in the state, without state sanctioned retailers, Washington was 
unable to accumulate the sales taxes and licensing fees Colorado collected 
through its medical marijuana program.  
Then in 2011, the legislature approved large changes to the state’s gov-
ernance of medical marijuana.  This included a state-wide licensing scheme, 
allowing the state to begin collecting revenue comparable to that generated 
by medical marijuana in Colorado.42  Washington Governor Christine Gre-
goire approved portions of the law, sanctioning “community gardens” for 
up to ten patients to grow marijuana.43  Utilizing the line-item veto, the 
Governor rejected all sections of the statute sanctioning state licensed pro-
ducers, processors, and dispensaries.44  She cited the United States Attor-
neys for the Eastern and Western District of Washington not ensuring im-
munity from federal prosecution for state employees working on this issue 
and collecting the revenue.45   
By vetoing this measure, Governor Gregoire foreclosed the opportunity 
for the state to begin collecting state licensing fees from retailers that Colo-
rado has been collecting for years.  Additionally, Washington was not col-
lecting state and local sales tax on the medical marijuana being consumed.  
Therefore, the revenue effect of medical marijuana to the Washington gov-
ernment was minimal. 
On December 29, 2011, supporters of Initiative 502 to legalize recrea-
tional marijuana submitted the proposal to the Washington Secretary of 
State’s office with the necessary signatures.46  Pursuant to state law the ini-
tiative was then sent to the state legislature, which had the power to directly 
reject the measure, enact it into law, or refer it to statewide election.47  The 
																																																													
41 WASH. REV. CODE § 69.51A.040(1) (2015). 
42 See S. Res. 6032, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007), available at 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/sourcefiles/SB6032WA.pdf.  
43 Scott Gutierrez & Vanessa Ho, Gregoire Vetoes Some Medical Marijuana Reforms, SEATTLE POST 
INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 29, 2011, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Gregoie-vetoes-medical-
marijuana-reforms-1358951.php. 
44 Jonathon Martin, Gregoire Vetoes Bill but Vows to Push Feds on Medical Marijuana, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Apr. 29, 2011, http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/gregoire-vetoes-bill-but-vows-to-push-
feds-on-medical-marijuana. 
45 Vitaliy Mkrtchyan, Note, Initiative 692, Now and Then: The Past, Present, and Future of Medical 
Marijuana in Washington State, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 839, 866 (2012). 
46 Joel Connelly, Marijuana Measure Headed for Ballot?, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 20, 
2011, http://blog.seattlepi.com/seattlepolitics/2011/12/20/marijuana-measure-headed-for-ballot. 
47 Id.  
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Washington legislature adjourned its legislative session in April without 
taking any action on the proposal, resulting in the initiative being placed on 
the November 2012 ballot for a state-wide vote.48 
In the November 2012 election, 56% of Washington voters chose to 
make recreational marijuana legal.49  This result aligned with what pre-
voting polls indicated.50  Washington voters embraced the potentially large 
taxes and fees generated by the marijuana industry as a way to deal with re-
cent state budgetary shortfalls.51   
Under Washington’s legal regime, producers, processors, and retailers 
are all subject to a $250 application fee and a $1,000 license issuance and 
renewal fee.52 Under the legislation passed after Initiative 502, the first 
layer of taxation was a 25% excise tax levied and collected from marijuana 
producers on each producer’s wholesale sale “to a licensed marijuana proc-
essor or another licensed marijuana producer.”53  The second tax was an-
other 25% excise tax on the sale from processors to licensed retailers.54  The 
final excise tax was 25% of the retail selling price to the consumer.55  
The retail sale of marijuana is also subject to the general state and local 
sales taxes on tangible property.56  The state and local sales tax is levied on 
both the retail price as well as the final excise tax.57  Despite being imposed 
earlier in the chain of commerce, the Washington Department of Revenue 
instructs consumers that each excise tax is included in the retail purchase 
price of recreational marijuana.58  This tax regime potentially shifted the in-
																																																													
48 Christina Salerno, Special Year in Review Edition of Legislative Review, CAPITOL RECORD, Apr. 13, 
2012, http://www.capitolrecord.org/2012/04/special-year-in-review-editon-of-legislative-review.  
49 Washington Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, Initiative 502 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Washington_Marijuana_Legalization_and_Regulation,_Initiative_502_(2012) (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2015). 
50 Id.  
51 Aaron Smith, Marijuana Legalization Passes in Colorado, Washington, CNN MONEY, Nov. 8, 2012, 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/07/news/economy/marijuana-legalization-washington-colorado. 
52 Initiative 502 – Fiscal Impact Statement, WASH. OFFICE OF FIN. MGMT, http://www.ofm.wa.gov/bal 
lot/2012/502_fiscal_impact.pdf 2 (last visited Apr. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Fiscal Impact Statement]. 
53 WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.535(1) (2014). “This tax is the obligation of the licensed marijuana pro-
ducer.” Id. 
54 WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.535(2) (2014). “This tax is the obligation of the licensed marijuana proc-
essor.” Id. 
55 WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.535(3) (2014). “This tax is the obligation of the licensed marijuana re-
tailer.” Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Taxes Due on Recreational Marijuana, WASH. DEP’T OF REVENUE, http://dor.wa.gov/content/find 
 76 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST  [Vol. XIX:ii 
	
cidence of all recreational marijuana taxation onto the consumer.  A Seattle 
recreational marijuana consumer, therefore, could pay up to 84.6% tax on 
legally purchased recreational marijuana, composed of the 9.6% state and 
local sales tax, the 25% producer excise tax, the 25% processor excise tax, 
and the 25% retailer excise tax according to these laws.  Washington now 
imposed a 37% excise tax on each retail sale.59  
Because of this high tax rate, and not having to account for tax revenue 
already being collected through the medical marijuana system, Washing-
ton’s revenue estimates were aggressive.  State revenue estimates ranged 
from $297 million60 up to $600 million in the first year of legalization.61  
The state also expected to generate $16.3 million in local sales and business 
tax revenue in the first year of legalization.62  In total, the Washington gov-
ernment’s state and local revenue projection from legalizing the sale of 
marijuana was $2.06 billion over the first five fiscal years of legalization, 
while not accounting for saved expenses associated with legalizing mari-
juana.63 
Washington is on pace to collect less revenue than initially predicted.  
The state’s Economic and Revenue Forecast Council adjusted its state reve-
nue projection to $694 million in state revenue through fiscal year 2019.64  
While this adjustment is an increase over a previous prediction of $636 mil-
lion, even accounting for two additional years it is a 66% decrease from ini-
tial revenue projections.  For the state’s next two-year budget cycle ending 
in fiscal year 2017, $237 million is anticipated to come from recreational 
marijuana, with $415 million budgeted for the following cycle ending in 
2019.65  
C.  Federal Law and Federal Taxation of Recreational Marijuana Busi-
nesses 
																																																																																																																																													
taxesandrates/marijuana/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2015). 
59 WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.535(1) (2015). 
60 Fiscal Impact Statement, supra note 52.   
61 Salerno, supra note 48.  
62 Fiscal Impact Statement, supra note 52.  
63 Fiscal Impact Statement, supra note 52 (including estimate which runs through fiscal year 2017). 
64 Rachel La Corte, Legal Pot in Washington Bringing in More Revenue than Predicted, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 20, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/20/legal-pot-washington-
market-tax-revenue_n_6191848.html. 
65 Id.  
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Despite the legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Wash-
ington, the drug remains illegal at the federal level.66  Marijuana is a Sched-
ule I narcotic according to the Controlled Substances Act.67  As such, an in-
dividual not violating state law by possessing or consuming marijuana, is 
still violating federal law.  The same applies for individuals producing, 
processing, or selling marijuana.   
The Supreme Court has held that the Controlled Substances Act governs 
and criminalizes entirely intrastate growers and consumers of marijuana.68  
In Gonzales v. Raich, two California individuals were growing state-
sanctioned medical marijuana at their residence only for personal consump-
tion in compliance with California law.69  The Supreme Court held that to 
be a violation of the Controlled Substances Act.70  The Court relied on 
precedent in extending federal commerce clause jurisdiction over an en-
tirely intrastate activity.71  The Court’s holding in Raich opens the door for 
federal regulation of intrastate recreational marijuana businesses in Colo-
rado and Washington.  While the federal government has the power to regu-
late recreational marijuana in this way, it has yet to exercise that power in a 
meaningful way. 
When determining taxable income, taxpayers are allowed to reduce their 
unrecovered investment in property from the amount received in a transac-
tion in the form of basis.72  Basis functions as a tax credit for previously 
taxed income invested in the property.  Business taxpayers are also entitled 
to deduct all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in a taxable year in 
order to determine taxable income.73  Deductions are only a matter of “leg-
islative grace”, however, and the burden rests with the taxpayer to demon-
strate qualifying for the deductions it takes.74  Congress also has the ability 
to take deductions away.  As such, Congress prohibits any deduction or 
credit “incurred in carrying on any trade or business if such trade or busi-
ness . . . consists of trafficking in controlled substances (within the meaning 
																																																													
66 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2012).   
67 Id.  
68 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32-33 (2005). 
69 Id. at 6-7.  
70 Id. at 9. (noting that the Court admittedly did not reach whether it was wise for Congress to exercise 
its powers in this way over marijuana, only that Congress could exercise this power). 
71 Id. at 17-21 (discussing Wickard v. Filburn’s similarities and precedential value to the case at hand).  
72 I.R.C. §1011(a) (2012). 
73 Id. at §162(a). 
74 New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).  
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of schedule I and II of the Controlled Substances Act) which is prohibited 
by Federal law.”75   
In Olive v. Commissioner, a California medical marijuana shop owner 
was charged with income tax deficiencies partially arising from disallowed 
business deductions under § 280E.76  The business owner petitioned the tax 
court for a re-determination of the tax liability, asserting California’s legali-
zation of medical marijuana as evidence the business was not engaged in 
“illegal trafficking in a controlled substance.”77  The Tax Court affirmed the 
Service’s position, that regardless of a state’s laws on marijuana, selling it 
is “trafficking” as stated in § 280E.78  As such, all federal tax deductions for 
marijuana businesses are prohibited.   
The court’s reliance on Raich,79 and its holding that § 280E includes 
marijuana as an illegal substance under federal law, dictates this outcome 
for all marijuana businesses.  The court did allow the taxpayer in Olive to 
utilize the inventory’s basis when calculating taxable income.80  Conse-
quently, recreational marijuana producers, processors, and retailers, in 
Colorado and Washington are not able to deduct their state taxes, licensing 
fees, and salaries in determining federal taxable income.  Even though the 
incidence of the state taxes and fees may be shifted to the consumer, the 
producer, processor, and retailer, as nominal payor of the taxes would typi-
cally be entitled to a deduction.81 
D.  The National War on Drugs   
The United States has been fighting the “war on drugs” since Richard 
Nixon occupied the Oval Office.82  On July 17, 1971, President Nixon de-
clared in a press conference that drug addiction had “assumed the dimen-
sions of a national emergency.”83  As a result, President Nixon asked for an 
																																																													
75 I.R.C. § 280E (2012). 
76 Olive v. Comm’r, 139 T.C. 19 (2012).   
77 Id. at 38. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. (citing Raich). 
80 Id. at 36.  
81 Businesses would not be entitled to a deduction for the excise tax levied directly on the consumer and 
only collected by the retailer, such as Colorado’s special 10% marijuana sales tax. COLO. REV. STAT. § 
39-28.8-202 (2015). 
82 Ed Vulliamy, Nixon’s ‘War on Drugs’ Began 40 Years Ago, and the Battle is Still Raging, THE 
GUARDIAN, July 23, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/society/2011/jul/24/war-on-drugs-40-years.  
83 Conor Friedersdorf, The War on Drugs Turns 40, THE ATLANTIC, JUN. 15, 2011, 
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initial $84 million for “emergency measures” to fight the problem.84  Four 
decades later, President Nixon’s declaration of war has cost $1 trillion and 
resulted in fewer victories than hoped for.  Colorado and Washington are 
the first states to embrace a new tactic in fighting this war–legalization–in 
the hope it addresses the fiscal casualties this war has wrought on the fed-
eral, state, and local governments.85   
1.  The Drug Wars’ Effect on Drug Use and Prison Population in America. 
In the over four-decade long time-span since President Nixon first de-
clared America’s “war on drugs”, much has changed.  In 1980, the United 
States had between 40,000 to 50,000 individuals imprisoned as a result of 
drug crimes.86  There are now 500,000 individuals incarcerated in federal, 
state, and local jails and prisons because of drug crimes—an increase of ap-
proximately 1,000%.87 
This surge in incarcerated individuals has led the United States to have 
the largest prison population in the world.88  Despite comprising only 5% of 
the global population, individuals incarcerated in the United States’ repre-
sent 25% of the world’s prison population.89  The United States’ prison rate 
																																																																																																																																													
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/06/the-war-on-drugs-turns-40/240472.  
84 Vulliamy, supra note 82. 
85 Jeffrey A. Miron & Katherine Waldock, The Budgetary Impact of Ending Drug Prohibition, CATO 
INST. 1 (2010), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/DrugProhibitionWP.pdf. “Legalization 
would reduce state and federal deficits by eliminating expenditure on prohibition enforcement— arrests, 
prosecutions, and incarceration—and by allowing governments to collect tax revenue on legalized 
sales.” Id. 
86 Richard Branson, War on Drugs a Trillion-Dollar Failure, CNN.COM, Dec. 7, 2012, 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/06/opinion/branson-end-war-on-drugs (citing 40,000 prisoners for com-
mitting drug crimes in 1980); Wasted Tax Dollars, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE, http://www.drugpolicy.org 
/wasted-tax-dollars (citing 50,000 prisoners for committing drug crimes in 1980).  
87 Branson, supra note 86. 
88 Adam Liptak, U.S. Prison Population Dwarfs That of Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/world/americas/23iht-23prison.12253738.html.  
89 Id.; Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Does the United States Really Have 5 Percent of the World’s Population 
and One Quarter of the World’s Prisoners?, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/04/30/does-the-united-states-really-have-five-percent-of-worlds-
population-and-one-quarter-of-the-worlds-prisoners. China is a distant second place on this notorious 
list, with a population for times larger than the United States’ but a prison population with almost 
560,000 fewer people. Highest to Lowest – Prison Population Total, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, http:// 
www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2015).  
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is second throughout the world, with 698 Americans in prison for every 
100,000 people.90   
This dramatic increase in the United States’ prison population over the 
past forty years is a direct result of the war on drugs.  The prison popula-
tion, however, cannot be the only measure of the successes and failures of 
the war on drugs.  Another critical metric gauging the country’s progress 
from July 17, 1971, is whether drug use has changed. 
Rather than achieve its desired result, the incarceration increase has not 
led to a corresponding decrease in drug consumption.91  Marijuana use spe-
cifically has increased, while consumption of other illicit drugs has largely 
stabilized.92  As drug use has increased, so has the number of individuals 
being arrested for drug crimes.   
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Re-
port, there were a total of 14,209,365 arrests made by federal, state, and lo-
cal law enforcement in 2007.93  Of this total, 1,841,182 individuals were ar-
rested for drug violations.94  When analyzing only the state and local level, 
42.1% of all drug possession related arrests in the United States are related 
to marijuana possession.95  The consequence of this number is that 5.46% of 
all state and local arrests in the United States are for marijuana possession.96  
																																																													
90 Highest to Lowest – Prison Population Rate, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, http://www.prisonstudies.org 
/highest-to-lowest/prison_population_rate?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All (last visited Nov. 14, 2015). 
This rate is second globally behind only Seychelles, an African archipelago in the Indian Ocean with a 
total population of 91,530. Data: Seychelles, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/sey 
chelles (last visited Nov. 14, 2015).  
91 DrugFacts: Nationwide Trends, NIH: NAT’L INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, (June 2015), https://www 
.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/nationwide-trends. According to the National Institute of Health’s 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health, since 2002 illicit drug use has increased from 8.3% to 9.4% of 
the American population age 12 or older. Id.  
92 Id. Marijuana use has increased the most of all illicit drugs surveyed, increasing from 5.8% of the 
population using marijuana in 2007 to 7.5% in 2013. Id. “‘Illicit’ refers to use of illegal drugs, including 
marijuana according to federal law, and misuse of prescription drugs. Id. 
93 Estimated Number of Arrests: United States, 2007, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table_29.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2015). The Uniform Crime 
Report “counts one arrest for each separate instance in which a person is arrested, cited, or summoned 
for an offense.” Persons Arrested, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007 
/arrests (last visited Nov. 14, 2015).  
94 Estimated Number of Arrests: United States, 2007, supra note 93. (noting that this amount comprises 
12.9% of the total number of arrests made in America in 2007 at the federal, state, and local level.)  
95 Miron & Waldock, supra note 85, at 3.  
96 Miron & Waldock, supra note 85, at 3. 
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Following all the arrests, 9.64% of all felony convictions in state and local 
courts are due to marijuana law violations.97 
All of these marijuana related arrests and convictions come at a cost: the 
costs of policing, enforcing, adjudicating, and imprisoning these individu-
als.  The annual cost just for state and local courts pursuing marijuana con-
victions is $1.66 billion.98  These are cost borne both directly and indirectly 
by the citizens of every state in the country, including Colorado and Wash-
ington. 
2.  The Explicit and Implicit Costs of the War on Drugs 
The United States has borne both implicit and explicit costs stemming 
from the four-decade war on drugs.  Since the war began, the bill totals $1 
trillion, with new costs incurred daily.99  Annually, the United States spends 
more than $40 billion on drug prohibition.100  This amount includes only the 
explicit costs, omitting all implicit costs such as violence, diminished inter-
national reputation, and the potentially deteriorating effects on local 
economies.101  Despite that money being spent on policing, enforcement, 
and imprisonment, the illegal drug trade generates an estimated $322 billion 
annually.102 
In addition to the vast explicit costs of the drug war, there are also wide-
ranging implicit costs that result from the war on drugs.  As with any illicit 
product it fuels crime, and in the case of drugs, it generates higher profits 
and enhanced power for organized crime.103  Another unfortunate implicit 
cost is the increased homicide rate the country has experienced during our 
																																																													
97 Miron & Waldock, supra note 85, at 3. 
98 Miron & Waldock, supra note 85, at 3. 
99 Branson, supra note 86.  
100 Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, About the Reasonableness of the Current Priorities of National Drug Con-
trol, RAND CORP., 1 (Mar. 12, 2008), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2008 
/RAND_CT302.pdf. 
101 Id. 
102 Thematic Debate of the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Drugs and Crime 
as a Threat to Development on the Occasion of the UN International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit 
Trafficking, GEN. ASSEMBLY UNITED NATIONS (June 26, 2012), http://www.un.org/en/ga/president 
/66/Issues/drugs/drugs-crime.shtml.  
103 Allison Schrager, The Economic Case for the US to Legalize All Drugs, QUARTZ, June 7, 2013, 
http://qz.com/91642/the-economic-case-for-the-us-to-legalize-all-drugs. 
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prolonged fight against drugs.104  The homicide rate is between 25-75% 
higher than it would be in the absence of drug prohibition.105 
These are the results of the illegal nature of the drug market.  Without the 
government being able to enforce private contracts, individuals must take 
enforcement into their own hands.106  This individual enforcement fosters 
the environment wherein explicit and implicit fiscal externalities are cre-
ated.  By Colorado and Washington making recreational marijuana legal, 
this explicit and implicit revenue will then begin accruing to state and local 
governments rather than drug sellers, who are by definition criminals. 
III.  UNDERSTANDING MARIJUANA TAXATION THROUGH TAX POLICY  
Myriad taxing and economic principles are incorporated in the state taxa-
tion of recreational marijuana.  In this section, this article analyzes the con-
cepts of incidence and elasticity that are intimately related to marijuana tax 
policy.  Excise taxes are then examined, and the developing marijuana tax 
system is compared to common excise tax regimes.  Finally, libertarian and 
redistribution theories of taxation are utilized to help inform the recreational 
marijuana taxation debate. 
A.  Incidence of Recreational Marijuana Excise Taxes  
Incidence of taxation is the most important topic in public finance, “for, 
in every system of taxation, the cardinal point is its influence on the com-
munity.”107  The person originally paying the tax bears the “original” inci-
dence,108 such as marijuana producers and the Washington’s initial 25% ex-
cise tax on production.109  The incidence of a tax may be economically 
transferred to a subsequent purchaser through charging more for the goods 
or services sold.  The tax may be borne by that second individual, or it may 
be effectively transferred further down the stream of commerce through 
																																																													
104 Jeffrey A. Miron, Violence and U.S. Prohibitions of Drugs and Alcohol, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. 
1 (Feb. 1999), http://www.nber.org/papers/w6950.pdf. The homicide rate experienced during the war on 
drugs rivals the murder rate observed during prohibition. Id. 
105 Id. Controlling for other variables does not alter this number in a statistically significant way. 
106 See id. at 3. (positing that because the drug market is illegal the methods available to enforce private 
contracts are also illegal). 
107 EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, THE SHIFTING AND INCIDENCE OF TAXATION 1 (5th ed., rev. Columbia 
Univ. Press 1927) (1899). 
108 Id. at 2. (presenting the idea of the original incidence but rejecting it). 
109 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.535 (West, Westlaw through 2015 3d Spec. Sess.). 
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subsequent price increases.  Where the tax burden finally resides is the true 
incidence of the tax.110  Only upon understanding the true incidence of taxa-
tion, can the effects of a tax be contextualized. 
Excise taxes are taxes “imposed on the manufacture, sale, or use of 
goods . . . or on an occupation or activity (such as a license tax . . .).”111  
The Service defines excise taxes as those taxes paid on specific goods, serv-
ices, and activities, and are often included in the price paid.112  One of the 
earliest adopters of the excise tax was Thomas Hobbes in his canonical Le-
viathan.113  Hobbes’ reasoning is that all people consume, so taxing con-
sumption cannot be evaded.114  While excise taxes cannot be evaded, the 
true incidence of that taxation can be shifted. 
Excise taxes generally serve two state goals: discouraging consumption 
or use of the taxed item,115 and generating revenue.116  Excise taxes are used 
when the government wants to discourage certain behaviors, such as con-
sumption of tobacco, alcohol, or soda.117  That model of taxation requires 
consumers to be rational actors, “maximiz[ing] utility over time.”118  If con-
sumers are not rational actors, the tax will not serve a deterrent function and 
																																																													
110 SELIGMAN, supra note 107. 
111 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 684–85 (10th ed. 2014).  
112 Excise Tax, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&Self-Employed/Excise-Tax (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2015). 
113 THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 386 (C.B. MACPHERSON ED., PENGUIN BOOKS 1968) (1651). 
114 “[T]he Equality of Imposition, consisteth rather in the Equality of that which is consumed, than of 
the riches of the persons that consume the same.  For what reason is there, that he which laboureth 
much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little, should be more charged, then he that living 
idlely, getteth little, and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no more protection from the Common-
wealth, then the other?  But when the Impositions, are layd upon those things which men consume, 
every man payeth Equally for what he useth: Nor is the Common-wealth defrauded, by the luxurious 
waste of private men.” Id. at 386–87. 
115 See, e.g., Tony Nitti, Tanning Tax is Here to Stay as IRS Publishes Final Regulations, FORBES, June 
12, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2013/06/12/tanning-tax-is-here-to-stay-as-irs-publish 
es-final-regulations (documenting the Affordable Care Act's 10% excise tax on indoor tanning services 
as a means to discourage their use); see also Indoor Tanning Services Tax Center, IRS, https:// 
www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Excise-Tax-on-Indoor-Tanning-Services-
Audit-Technique-Guide. 
116 See Excise Tax, supra note 112.  
117 Laura Mandaro, Nation's First Soda Tax is Passed, USA TODAY, Nov. 5 2014, http://www.usatoday 
.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/11/05/berkeley-passes-soda-tax/18521923 (citing the nation's first 
soda tax as a way to discourage consumption of the beverage many critics link to obesity); see also 
BERKELEY, CAL. MUN. CODE, ch. 7.72, § 2 (Jan. 1, 2015); BERKELEY, CAL. MUN. CODE, ch. 7.72, § 
7.72.010 (Jan. 1, 2015) http://codepublishing.com/ca/berkeley/ (follow to "Title 7 Finance, Revenue, 
and Taxes;" then Chapter 7.72 "Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Product Distribution Tax"). 
118 Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96 J. POL. ECON. 675, 694 
(1988). 
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will only generate revenue.  The non-rational actor model could serve as 
one reason for states imposing excise taxes on tobacco, alcohol, and now 
recreational marijuana, because it is believed consumers will not rationally 
respond and no deterrence will result.  This theory fuels the notion of rais-
ing sin taxes to address revenue shortfalls. 
True incidence of the tax is also critical to understanding its effect.  If the 
full burden of excise taxes imposed earlier in the stream of commerce 
comes to bear on the final consumer through higher prices, it may discour-
age consumption.119  The practice of shifting incidence to the consumer also 
has been shown to increase prices consumers pay beyond just the amount of 
tax imposed.120  Shifting the incidence of tobacco excise taxes reduces pro-
ducer revenue by only eight cents for every dollar increase in tax revenue.121 
When states increase excise taxes on cigarettes consumption does go 
down.122  As a result of tobacco demand elasticity being low, tobacco excise 
tax increases are viewed as a frequently available source of revenue.123  To-
bacco consumption declines as excise taxes increase, but those quitting do 
not offset the revenue gain from tax increases.124  This evidence reinforces 
the notion that tobacco demand elasticity is low.  While tobacco is legal na-
tionwide, state and federal public policy frequently acts to reduce tobacco 
consumption (and budget deficits) through increased excise taxes.125   
The goal of increasing state revenue through marijuana taxation is in ten-
sion with the states’ Prohibition-style approach of imposing a high rate of 
tax to moderate consumption of a recently-legalized product.126  Despite 
																																																													
119 Andrew Hanson & Ryan Sullivan, The Incidence of Tobacco Taxation: Evidence from Geographic 
Micro-Level Data, 62 NAT'L TAX J. 677, 677 (2009). 
120 Using the tobacco tax increase in Wisconsin as an experiment, the authors found an 8-17% overshift 
beyond the excise tax amount to consumers.  Id. at 695. 
121 William N. Evans, Jeanne S. Ringel & Diana Stech, Tobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage 
Smoking, 13 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 1, 1 (1999). 
122 Id. at 16. 
123 Id. at 31. 
124 Andy Marso, Researcher: Tobacco Tax a Reliable Revenue Source, KANSAS HEALTH INSTITUTE, 
March 9, 2015, http://www.khi.org/news/article/researcher-tobacco-tax-a-reliable-revenue-source. 
125 See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore, Cigarette Tax Increased to Keep State Running, N.Y. TIMES, June 
21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/nyregion/22budget.html; see also Andy Marso, Lower 
Revenue Numbers Could Force New Talks on Tobacco Tax, KANSAS HEALTH INSTITUTE, Apr. 21, 2015, 
http://kcur.org/post/lower-kansas-revenue-numbers-could-force-new-talks-tobacco-tax. 
126 Vikas Bajaj, Rules for the Marijuana Market, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2014, http://www.nytimes 
.com/2014/08/05/opinion/high-time-rules-for-the-marijuana-market.html (recognizing that Colorado and 
Washington are implementing a Prohibition-era system to allow consumption, while also discouraging it 
through taxes); see also Joseph Henchman, Lessons on Legalizing and Taxing Marijuana from the Colo-
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embracing legalization in lieu of criminalization, the states are still attempt-
ing to use taxes to modify consumer behavior and prevent over-
consumption or dependence.127  The tax revenue being generated in Colo-
rado and Washington may not alone close budget shortfalls, but it does help 
solve budget problems.128  The taxes levied on the marijuana industry, and 
borne by marijuana consumers through shifting incidence, dwarfs compara-
ble excise taxes in both Colorado and Washington.129 
In Colorado, a pack of cigarettes is subject to an eighty-four cent state 
tobacco excise tax, the state and local sales tax, as well as the $1.01 federal 
tobacco tax.130  This approximate 40% tax is matched by the 40% tax levied 
on all other tobacco products.131  Only half of that tax revenue, however, is 
Colorado’s as the other half is a federal tax.  Colorado’s alcohol excise tax 
is levied on wholesalers at a rate of eight cents per gallon for beer and 
twenty-eight cents per gallon for wine.132  By comparison, Colorado’s ex-
cise tax on marijuana reaches up to 36.15%, exceeding the state’s excise tax 
rate on both tobacco or alcohol.133   
Washington imposes a $3.025 state excise tax on a pack of cigarettes, in 
addition to state and local sales tax, and the federal tobacco tax.134  Tobacco 
consumers in Washington pay the state a 67% tobacco excise tax.  Beer is 
not subject to state excise taxes in excess of state and local sales taxes in 
Washington, and wine is subject to an 86.8 cents per gallon excise tax in 
																																																																																																																																													
rado and Washington Experience, TAX FOUND., Oct. 30, 2014, http://taxfoundation.org/article/lessons-
legalizing-and-taxing-marijuana-colorado-and-washington-experience-testimony-district. 
127 E.g., Bajaj, supra note 126. 
128 Benjamin Fearnow, Marijuana to Boost Washington State Tax Revenue by $25M in the Next Year, 
CBS SEATTLE, Sept. 18, 2014, http://seattle.cbslocal.com/2014/09/18/marijuana-to-boost-washington-
state-tax-revenue-by-25m-in-the-next-year. 
129 The Washington Department of Revenue states that recreational marijuana excise tax is “going from 
25 percent (at each level) to 37 percent on the retail customer.” Taxes Due on Recreational Marijuana, 
supra note 58. 
130 Cigarette Tax File, COLO. DEP’T REVENUE, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/tax/cigarette-tax-file 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2015); see Jolie Lee, How Pot Tax Compares with Other ‘Sin” Taxes, USA 
TODAY, Nov. 4, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/04/marijuana-tax-colorado 
/3344129. On a $5 retail pack of twenty cigarettes, the consumer will pay a total of $7. Id. 
131 Lee, supra note 130. 
132 Colorado Liquor Excise Taxes, COLO. DEP’T REVENUE, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/revenue 
/colorado-liquor-excise-taxes (last visited, Nov. 13, 2015). 
133 Over half of the revenue collected from the excise tax on tobacco is a federal excise tax, making the 
total Colorado tobacco excise and sales tax approximately 20%. See Lee, supra note 130. 
134 Cigarette Tax, WASH. DEP’T REVENUE 1 (Mar. 2015), http://dor.wa.gov/Docs/Pubs/CigarTax 
/CigaretteTax.pdf. 
 86 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST  [Vol. XIX:ii 
	
addition to the state and local sales tax.135  Thus, Washington’s marijuana 
excise tax from Initiative 502 of up to 84.16% is still greater than both the 
state’s tobacco or alcohol excise tax rate.  Washington has begun address-
ing the revenue shortfall generated by the onerous marijuana taxes by re-
placing the original tax regime with a 37% tax only on the retail customer. 
Colorado and Washington may be enabled to levy their highest excise 
tax on marijuana because they are both one of the few places in the United 
States to legally purchase marijuana.  This allows Colorado and Washing-
ton to tax marijuana like an exclusive natural resource.  By doing so, they 
must also evaluate how potential consumers respond to these taxes.  The tax 
rate disparity between recreational marijuana and tobacco and alcohol raises 
the possibility of a substitution effect, considering alcohol and tobacco bear 
similarities to marijuana.  The substantial difference in tax rate may encour-
age potential marijuana consumers to alter their consumption pattern.  Con-
sequently, appraising Colorado and Washington’s marijuana excise taxes 
requires an evaluation of the market’s elasticity.  
B.  Elasticity and its Effect on Marijuana 
Elasticity is the “measure of a variable’s sensitivity to a change in an-
other variable.”136  For the purposes of this article’s analysis, elasticity is the 
measure of how demand and supply change in relation to changes in price 
and levels of taxation.  In a perfect marketplace, without taxes, the demand 
curve and supply curve meet one another to arrive at the market’s equilib-
rium.137  When taxes are levied on buyers, however, and the overall price of 
goods increases, consumer surplus decreases.138  Conversely, when taxes 
are levied on suppliers their producer surplus also decreases.139  Deadweight 
loss is the reduction in total consumer and supplier surplus resulting from a 
market distortion.140   
Elasticity measures how demand and supply change as a result from the 
government’s alteration of the price through taxes.  Regardless of whom a 
																																																													
135 Liquor Pricing Information, WASH.  LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD, http://liq.wa.gov/stores/liquor-
pricing (last visited Nov. 13, 2015). 
136 Elasticity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/elasticity.asp (last visited Nov. 13, 
2015).  
137 N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 76 (3d ed. 2004). 
138 Id. at 161. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 163.  
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tax is levied on, or who bears the tax’s incidence, both buyers and sellers 
share the tax’s burden as supply and demand respond to the tax.141  One ex-
ample of a market distortion are the excise taxes Colorado and Washington 
impose on marijuana. 
Inelastic supply occurs when despite alterations in price the quantity 
supplied does not change.142  Inelastic demand is when consumer’s desire 
for a product is unaffected by increases in price.143  If supply or demand is 
inelastic, tax increases result in little deadweight loss, whereas elastic sup-
ply or demand results in large deadweight loss.144  The challenge for Colo-
rado and Washington is gauging the elasticity for both supply and demand 
of marijuana and the amount of deadweight loss created by the marijuana 
excise taxes. 
There is evidence that demand for legally purchased marijuana is rela-
tively elastic.  In Colorado there remains an active black market trade in 
marijuana.145  State officials estimate that only 60% of the marijuana con-
sumed in Colorado is sold legally.146  Influencing the persistence of the 
black market in Colorado, despite legal alternatives, is the price difference 
between black market marijuana and its more expensive legal counter-
part.147  The price discrepancy arising between the two marketplaces is fu-
eled by the state’s excise taxes placed on marijuana produced and sold at 
retail.  In addition, questionable medical marijuana establishments are aid-
ing the thriving black market.148 
As in Colorado, Washington’s demand for legal marijuana is also elas-
tic.149  In Washington, “some pot delivery services brazenly advertis[e] that 
they sell outside the legal system” allowing those businesses to massively 
																																																													
141 Id. at 160.  
142 Inelastic Supply, BUS. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/inelastic-supply 
.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2015). 
143 Inelastic Demand, BUS. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/inelastic-
demand.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2015). 
144 MANKIW, supra note 137, at 165. 
145 Deborah Camiel, Underground Weed: Colorado’s Black Market, CNBC, Dec. 17, 2014, http://www 
.cnbcprime.com/marijuana/video/pot-after-hours-the-black-market. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. (stating that marijuana purchased on the black market can be as much as one-third of the price of 
legally purchased marijuana from a state licensed retailer).  
148 Gene Johnson, Legalizing Marijuana in Washington and Colorado Hasn’t Gotten Rid of the Black 
Market, BUS. INSIDER, Jan. 2, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/legal-marijuana-in-washington-
and-colorado-hasnt-gotten-rid-of-the-black-market-2015-1. 
149 Id. 
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undercut competitors on price.150  The cited reason in Washington for the 
black market’s influence is the taxes placed on retail marijuana.151  Conse-
quently, many of the retail consumers in Washington are tourists, whereas 
many individuals continue utilizing black market means to obtain mari-
juana, including those businesses openly flouting state law.152 
The result of this demand elasticity is increased deadweight loss in both 
Colorado and Washington.  Consumers are not entering the legal market-
place because their demand is price sensitive, showing that state excise 
taxes help create the prohibitively high barrier to entry.  Business owners 
who entered the retail marijuana market cannot compete for customers as 
they are being undercut on price.   
Evidence supports the legal recreational marijuana supply curve is elas-
tic, however, it is relatively more inelastic than the demand curve.  As a re-
sult of the lengthy process to become a licensed marijuana retailer, the de-
mand curve is more fluid than the supply curve. Also, the actual crop 
supply is initiated months prior to its retail sale, so the true supply is not in-
stantly responsive to customer demands.153  This phenomenon, mixed with 
the active marijuana black market, is the cause of Washington’s excess 
marijuana supply.154 
The elasticity in both the supply and the demand curve creates dead-
weight loss.155  The deadweight loss is borne by all parties involved in retail 
marijuana transactions: the producers, processors, retailers, and customers, 
as well as state governments collecting tax revenue.156  It is in both Colo-
rado and Washington’s best interest to reduce this deadweight loss in order 
to maximize the legal market and minimize its illegal counterpart, while 
still collecting sufficient tax revenue and maximizing cost savings from le-
																																																													
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Jane Wells, Washington Has More Pot Than It Can Smoke, NBC NEWS, Feb. 11, 2015, http://www 
.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/washington-has-more-pot-it-can-smoke-n304436. 
154 See Gene Johnson, Washington’s Marijuana Growers Struggle to Sell Product, PORTLAND PRESS 
HERALD, Jan. 17, 2015, http://www.pressherald.com/2015/01/17/washingtons-marijuana-growers-
struggle-sell-product (stating that the supply is so excessive that some producers may actually be going 
out of business).   
155 See MANKIW, supra note 137, at 166.  
156 See MANKIW, supra note 137, at 163–65.  
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gal marijuana.  How the states should go about doing this is the subject of 
Part IV of this article.157 
C.  Rawls, Nozick and the Theories behind Marijuana Excise Taxation 
John Rawls and Robert Nozick espouse opposing theories about taxation 
and its purpose.  These competing theories apply to the principles under-
girding the excise taxation schemes levied by Washington and Colorado on 
recreational marijuana.  Once understood, these theories of taxation and so-
cial justice may then be employed to create a more optimal excise tax sys-
tem. 
1.  Rawlsian Philosophy and Marijuana Taxes 
In Mr. Rawls’s famous work, A Theory of Justice, he puts forth two theo-
ries of justice.  First, “each person is to have an equal right to the most ex-
tensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others [,]” and 
second, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
to anyone’s advantage.158  Rawls allows for long run inequalities only if 
they are to the benefit of those in the worst position.159    Thus, a society is 
just only if “it is engaged in redressing social inequalities, if it serves to 
benefit those [Rawls] calls the least advantaged.”160 
Appraising the marijuana excise tax through a Rawlsian framework re-
quires evaluating whether the current excise taxing regime in Colorado and 
Washington creates more inequality than the system prior to legalization of 
retail marijuana.  The taxes in Colorado and Washington do create inequal-
ity in the marketplace, affecting both suppliers and consumers.  The black 
market is still active because of the price discrepancy between taxed legal 
marijuana and the untaxed illegally obtained marijuana.  Inequality also 
arises from more well-off customers being able to pay higher prices, and in 
turn gain the benefits of government protected commerce.  Whereas the 
lesser advantaged consumers must forego the privileges of purchasing legal 
marijuana and continue to traffic in the black market in exchange for a re-
duced price. 
																																																													
157 See infra Part IV. 
158 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 53 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999) (1971). 
159 ADAM SWIFT, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 52 (3d ed. 2014). 
160 STEVEN B. SMITH, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 186 (2012). 
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According to Rawls, if inequality is created it must benefit society’s least 
advantaged.161  This tenant of Rawls’ philosophy requires a balancing test 
as a large portion of the money being collected in Colorado is going toward 
public school construction.  That money also may be coming from less ad-
vantaged individuals and making up a larger portion of their income, as ex-
cise and consumption taxes disproportionately affect lower income taxpay-
ers.162  The Rawlsian balancing test must also account for retail marijuana 
being a luxury item.  If marijuana itself is a necessity for an individual, both 
Washington and Colorado have programs for persons with chronic prob-
lems to obtain medical marijuana without paying the excise taxes.163 
It is arguable that the current system is best for all involved.  Those with 
means can afford to pay higher legal prices, while those without are able to 
continue obtaining marijuana in the same way used prior to legalization.  
Additionally, even though marijuana is purchased illegally, personal con-
sumption is now legal, so illegal purchasers still receive some of the law’s 
benefits.  Notwithstanding this possibility, these facts may serve to under-
score the inequality existing in Washington and Colorado because of the 
current approach.  With the higher purchase price comes the benefit of po-
lice and contract enforcement, as well as safety and health verifications that 
are not provided in the black market. 
Finally, the same good could be achieved for everyone’s goals without 
creating inequality.164  The current goals of taxing marijuana are to raise 
revenue, while also imposing a stringent enough excise tax to discourage 
over-consumption,165 much in the same way state and local governments 
have handled alcohol taxation.166  Lowering the rate of excise tax on mari-
juana has the potential to expand the base of taxpayers participating in the 
legal system.  This reduces inequality by making private retail businesses 
more competitive while benefitting consumers of less financial means as 
they may participate in the regulated and protected marketplace. 
																																																													
161 RAWLS, supra note 158, at 53–54. 
162 “There is nothing inherently regressive about a sales tax or even a poll tax. They are regressive be-
cause income is unequally distributed, and the more unequally income is distributed, the more regressive 
they become.” Daniel B. Suits, Measurement of Tax Progressivity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 747, 752 (1977). 
163 See Taxes Due on Recreational Marijuana, supra note 58; Marijuana Taxes: Quick Answers, supra 
note 24. 
164 Decreasing equal liberty “cannot be justified, or compensated for, by greater social and economic 
advantages.” RAWLS, supra note 158, at 53-54. 
165 See Bajaj, supra note 126. 
166 See Confessore, supra note 125.  
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2.  Nozick and the States’ Marijuana Taxation Policies 
Three characteristics of Nozick’s libertarian philosophy of social justice 
are directly applicable to the debate pertaining to levels of excise tax on rec-
reational marijuana.  First, Nozick believes that individuals are entitled to 
own goods that they acquire from legitimate owners in a voluntary trans-
fer.167  Second, Nozick favors a reduced role for the state, limited to narrow 
functions of protecting against force, theft, fraud, and the enforcement of 
contracts.168  Lastly, Nozick supports the minimal state because it hinders 
the government’s ability to redistribute wealth.169 
According to Nozick, individuals are entitled to own goods legitimately 
acquired.170  Legitimate acquisition also includes producing goods if the 
necessary resources were also legitimately acquired.171  As legitimate own-
ers, the state has the right to tax (or charge for the privilege) for the use of 
anything it owns legitimately.172  In Colorado and Washington, it is legal to 
produce, process, and sell marijuana, so it may be assumed that the means 
of production have been legitimately acquired.  These means of production 
were legally granted in consideration for the state collecting taxes on them.  
In one respect, Nozick’s principles claim the state should not interfere with 
the chain of voluntary sales transactions through taxation.   
The marijuana excise taxes may be unjust to Nozick because it taxes in-
dividuals for the right to process and possess a substance state law says 
each has a right to.  The right to marijuana production and consumption, 
however, was granted by the state so that it could be taxed.  Thus, there is 
an argument supporting taxing legitimacy as it was granted by the state as a 
condition of decriminalization, but removing government interference with 
																																																													
167 See Ralf Bader, Robert Nozick, in 11 MAJOR CONSERVATIVE AND LIBERTARIAN THINKERS 39 (John 
Meadowcroft ed., 2010); see generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). 
168 NOZICK, supra note 167, at 26. 
169 See NOZICK, supra note 167, at 168. (stating, “Patterned principles of distributive justice necessitate 
redistributive activities. . . . From the point of view of an entitlement theory, redistribution is a serious 
matter indeed, involving, as it does, the violation of people’s rights.”). 
170 Bader, supra note 167, at 38. 
171 NOZICK, supra note 167, at 177; see Bader, supra note 166, at 39. (explaining Nozick’s critique of 
John Locke’s theory of appropriation: [P]rivate ownership of a resource must be sufficiently beneficial 
to ensure that those who are no longer at liberty to use the resource are not worsened by the appropria-
tion. This condition should not be understood as a utilitarian justification of property but as a condition 
that ensures that others are not harmed by an appropriation. 
172 See generally NOZICK, supra note 167. 
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the legitimate owners of marijuana also aligns with Nozick’s libertarian 
philosophy of social justice.   
An alternative approach views the state as also having the right to legiti-
mately tax or charge for the use of the land within its borders.  One could 
view the state as the original owner and contributor of land within its bor-
ders.  This view justifies the state having an ability to charge greater prop-
erty tax from those using property to cultivate and sell marijuana.  This ap-
proach would continue raising revenue but in a different manner.  Although 
such an approach does not satisfy Nozick’s views on property ownership, as 
the individual becomes the legitimate land owner upon purchase.  This is 
similar to the state decriminalizing marijuana in exchange for the ability to 
impose a tax on it.  Also, this method of tax does not remedy the issues pre-
sented by the marijuana excise taxes.  While being a potential alternative, it 
does not closely conform to Nozick’s libertarian view. 
Libertarian philosophy also favors a minimal role for the state to ensure 
social justice.173  A minimal state limited to narrow functions protecting 
against force, theft, and fraud, while enforcing contracts is justified whereas 
any more extensive state violates citizen’s rights.174  Nozick’s main goal of 
the minimalist state is to avoid the government’s tendency toward redistrib-
uting wealth and restricting individual freedoms.175  “Noteworthy implica-
tions are that the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of 
getting some citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to peo-
ple for their own good or protection.”176  Thus, free market mechanisms are 
socially just. 
Now that retail marijuana is legal in Colorado and Washington, the de-
bate regarding its illegality and Nozick’s libertarian view on that matter is 
beyond the scope of this article.  The excise tax on marijuana in Colorado 
and Washington expands the scope of the states’ taxing authority.  The 
move to decriminalize marijuana, however, reduces overall state coercion in 
the marijuana economy.  Both states’ governance of marijuana becomes 
primarily through the tax system and generating revenue, rather than 
through the criminal justice system spending revenue.  The states’ decision 
																																																													
173 See generally NOZICK, supra note 167. 
174 See generally NOZICK, supra note 167. 
175 See e.g., RALF M. BADER, ROBERT NOZICK 112 (John Meadowcroft ed., Continuum Press 2010) 
(“[Nozick] places great importance on individual rights and the need to respect the separateness and 
dignity of persons.”). 
176 See NOZICK, supra note 167, at ix. 
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to decriminalize marijuana conforms to Nozick’s narrow definition of the 
legitimate functions of government.  Despite the positives resulting from 
marijuana decriminalization, libertarianism still views the excise taxes as an 
illegitimate redistribution of wealth.  The redistribution is accomplished by 
restricting consumers and suppliers from arriving at a mutually agreeable 
free market price for the product through government intervention. 
Nozick is a proponent of the minimal state because it hinders the gov-
ernment’s ability to redistribute wealth.177  “Redistribution is serious matter 
indeed, involving . . . the violation of people’s rights.”178  This supports the 
view of the free market being just, and interferences in the free market be-
ing unjust.179  Placing excise taxes at different levels of marijuana com-
merce is unjust to Nozick because it inhibits the good from being sold at the 
free market price.  Excise taxes artificially inflating the price create dead-
weight loss in the market.  That deadweight loss is the charge being levied 
on the economy through the government’s taxation policy.   
The deadweight loss is evidenced in Washington by the surplus of le-
gally grown marijuana that cannot be sold.180  It is also evidenced in the 
persistent existence of the black market in both Colorado and Washington 
as black market dealers are able to sell at lower prices than legal establish-
ments encumbered by excise taxes.181  Nozick’s philosophy dictates both 
producers and consumers are better off with decriminalized marijuana but 
would be even better without the imposition of marijuana excise taxes.  
This would allow the socially just free market to determine the optimal lev-
els of production, consumption, and price. 
Rawls’s and Nozick’s views oppose one another and cannot be com-
pletely reconciled, but embracing the tension between their viewpoints 
helps reach a more optimal system of marijuana excise taxation.  The dis-
cussed economic principles of elasticity, incidence, and deadweight loss 
animate those philosophies in creating the better system of marijuana excise 
taxation.  By incorporating these philosophical and economic frameworks, 
an optimal tax system for recreational marijuana may now be determined. 
																																																													
177 NOZICK, supra note 167, at 111-115. 
178 NOZICK, supra note 167, at 168. 
179 NOZICK, supra note 167, at 159. 
180 See generally Johnson, supra note 154 see also Wells, supra note 153. 
181 E.g., Camiel, supra note 145. 
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D. Cost Savings of Legalized Marijuana in Colorado and Washington 
In addition to taxes generated, there are also a plethora of cost savings 
for state and local governments that are generated by legalizing recreational 
marijuana.  These savings are generated by a decreased need for police, and 
the reduction in prosecutorial, judicial, incarceration, and probationary ex-
penses that result.182  Across the United States, an estimated $8.7 billion in 
annual savings would be generated by legalizing recreational marijuana.183  
This estimate, however, is the topmost cost savings that could be expected 
if all state and local governments legalized recreational marijuana.184 
At the state and local government level across the entire United States, 
42.1% of all drug possession related arrests are related to marijuana posses-
sion.185  The upshot of that number is that 5.46% of all state and local ar-
rests in the United States, for every possible infraction, are for marijuana 
possession.  Eliminating marijuana arrests saves $2.67 billion annually from 
prosecutorial and judicial budgets that otherwise is spent on the resulting 
criminal cases, with an additional $1.14 billion saved on reduced correc-
tions budgets.186  The net savings to state and local governments for legaliz-
ing recreational marijuana is $5.39 billion, which includes the reduction in 
fines collected from defendants and assets seized by police in relation to 
marijuana arrests.187 
The Colorado state and municipal governments spent over $74 million 
																																																													
182 Miron & Waldock, supra note 85, at 2 (Stating that state and local government savings are generated 
by “the reduction of expenditures of police resources from eliminating drug arrests; the reduction in 
prosecutorial and judicial resources from eliminating drug prosecutions; and the reduction in correc-
tional resources from eliminating drug incarcerations.”). 
183 Miron & Waldock, supra note 85, at 1.  (The study’s state and local government savings are esti-
mated using a procedure wherein: “It estimates the percentage of state and local arrests for drug viola-
tions and multiplies this percentage by the state and local budget for police (subject to one adjustment 
discussed below). It estimates the percentage of state and local felony convictions for drug violations 
and multiplies this percentage by the state and local budget for prosecutors and judges (subject to one 
adjustment described below). It estimates the percentage of state and local incarcerations for drug viola-
tions and multiplies this percentage by the state and local budget for prisons. It then sums these compo-
nents to estimate the overall reduction in state and local government expenditures. Under plausible as-
sumptions, this procedure yields a reasonable estimate of the cost savings from drug legalization.”) 
Miron & Waldock, supra note 85, at 2. 
184 Legalization as understood by Miron and Waldock is the removal of all penalties associated with 
smuggling and selling of recreational marijuana. Miron & Waldock, supra note 85. 
185 Miron & Waldock, supra note 85, at 3. 
186 Miron & Waldock, supra note 85, at 4. 
187 Miron & Waldock, supra note 85, at 5. 
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annually attributable to marijuana prohibition.188  Washington state and lo-
cal governments spent an even greater sum—over $98.9 million.189  In part, 
this money paid for the attendant costs of all marijuana arrests in both 
states—which make up 2.79% of all Colorado arrests each year,190 and 
3.15% of all Washington arrests.191  Consequently, Colorado and Washing-
ton should respectively realize an additional gain of $74 million and $98.9 
million in the form of reduced police, prosecutorial, and judicial expenses. 
These savings, however, are not fully realized because of the ample 
black market resulting from both states’ inefficient taxation of marijuana.192  
As long as a thriving black market exists for the sale and production of ille-
gal marijuana, Colorado and Washington will incur unintended expenses in 
trying to eliminate it.  Until there is an efficient allocation of resources, 
which eliminates the necessity of the black market, Colorado and Washing-
ton will still incur policing, prosecuting, and judicial expenses for mari-
juana, albeit less than before. 
IV.  HOW A MODIFIED TAXING APPROACH CAN REDUCE DEADWEIGHT 
LOSS AND REALIZE INCREASED REVENUE FOR COLORADO AND 
WASHINGTON. 
This article establishes the system of recreational marijuana excise taxes 
in Washington to be less successful at revenue generation than anticipated 
and a handicap to creating a competitive legal marketplace with the illegal 
market.  The tax system in Colorado is less onerous and has proven to be 
moderately more in accordance with state revenue projections as it features 
lower rates.193  Decreasing the rates further, however, could benefit all mar-
ket participants—including the government.  The initial attempts at mari-
juana excise taxation developed an understanding of its economic effects 
and its philosophical underpinnings.  Using this knowledge, a better system 
of taxation is proposed.   
Colorado and Washington currently have little recourse to combat the 
																																																													
188 Miron & Waldock, supra note 85 (according to statistics based on 2008). 
189 Miron & Waldock, supra note 85, at 6. 
190 Miron & Waldock, supra note 85, at 18–19. 
191 Miron & Waldock, supra note 85 at 20–21.  
192 See supra text accompanying notes 145–52. 
193 See supra text accompanying notes 26–27; see also Fiscal Impact Statement, supra note 52 (Wash-
ington’s top tax rate on recreational marijuana is 84.6% versus Colorado’s highest rate of 36.15%). 
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lack of allowable federal deductions for legal marijuana businesses in their 
state.194  One potential alternative is to allow businesses a credit on their 
state income tax return in an amount equal to the disallowed federal deduc-
tion.  This option has little viability as the state would be robbing itself of 
the revenue lower tax rates generate for it.  This discrepancy between legal 
marijuana purveyors and other businesses is actually of little concern 
though, because all legal marijuana businesses in the two states are bound 
by the same laws.  Of greater import is using the state’s excise tax system to 
aid legal marijuana businesses, contemporaneously squashing their untaxed 
illegal counterparts. 
The presence of a flourishing illegal marijuana trade is evidence of 
deadweight loss, with consumers opting to purchase illegal black market 
marijuana when they know they could purchase legal marijuana.195  This 
deadweight loss indicates that among other things, the optimal tax system 
has not been found.196  By reducing the retail price through decreasing 
taxes, the legal market becomes a more viable alternative to the black mar-
ket.  This reduces the market’s deadweight loss that fuels the black mar-
ket.197  As more consumers transition to the legal market, the tax base ex-
pansion then partially compensates for the revenue foregone by lowering 
the tax rates.  This process becomes a positive feedback cycle, as more 
revenue is generated for the government it can better combat the black mar-
ket, in turn creating more legal customers and generating more revenue.  
Another beneficiary of that process is legal producers, as more customers 
fuel greater demand for legal alternatives. 
The incidence of tax would continue to rest on the consumer if the Wash-
ington and Colorado laws still allow taxes to be shifted down the stream of 
commerce.198  Laws could be enacted saying the tax must be separately 
stated, or not passed on, but policing the transfer of actual incidence is dif-
ficult.  The producer, processor, and retailer, would still have the ability to 
gross-up prices to accommodate for the tax being levied at each phase of 
production even if not explicitly passed on.  Under current laws, this gross-
up will still come to rest on the consumer as each gross-up encompasses the 
																																																													
194 I.R.C. § 280E (West 2015). 
195 Camiel, supra note 145 at 1 (quoting a black market patient stating price difference is one reason he 
purchases on the black market versus using a licensed retail store).  
196 See supra text accompanying notes 145-148.  
197 See Mankiw, supra note 137, at 76.  
198 Taxes Due on Recreational Marijuana, supra note 58 (stating specifically that the purchase price 
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previous step’s price increase.199  A lower rate at each step, however, would 
exponentially reduce the impact on the consumer.  Washington is already 
attempting such a change, by shifting all the taxes onto the consumer, but at 
a lower rate.200  The success of this approach remains to be seen, as the rate 
may still be too high to generate the change necessary to effect consumers’ 
elastic demand curve. 
Marijuana consumers also demonstrate an elastic demand curve.  Fueling 
this elasticity, consumers have the option of purchasing less highly taxed 
substitution products like alcohol and tobacco, as well as black market 
marijuana.201  The high taxes on legal marijuana and its readily available 
and cheaper black market alternative contributes to this elasticity.202  Any-
one with an internet connection has access to a plethora of illegal marijuana 
sellers, all selling below the price available at retail.203  Reducing excise 
taxes on marijuana also helps address this elastic demand curve. 
Consumers choosing the black market will be incentivized to purchase 
legal retail marijuana as its prices become more competitive with the illegal 
options.  Consequently, consumers will respond with greater demand when 
prices decrease.  This increased demand creates a wider taxing base, facili-
tating the reduced tax rate while still collecting substantially similar reve-
nue.  The wider base with a reduced rate potentially does not generate the 
same amount of gross revenue as the higher tax rate does, but it could lead 
to similar or greater net budgetary benefits.  The expanded legal retail mari-
juana market diminishes the persistent black market.  This results in fewer 
law enforcement resources being required to deal with the shrinking black 
market.  Those reduced budgets contribute to the net revenue resulting from 
a lower rate that expands the net revenue generation.  
The elasticity in the supply curve would also respond to decreasing taxes.  
Each link in the production chain could now potentially charge less as the 
																																																													
199 Taxes Due on Recreational Marijuana, supra note 58. 
200 See Taxes Due on Recreational Marijuana, supra note 58. (stating that this approach has already 
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201 Camiel, supra note 145. 
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on Craigslist as a “health and beauty” product).  
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government is taking a smaller amount.  The legal market’s increased cus-
tomer demand would help make up lost revenue from price reduction.  
Government may in turn be tempted to regulate the price that each pro-
ducer, processor, and retailer could charge as a means of addressing its re-
duced role in the market.  This would distort the supply curve, recreating 
the deadweight loss this proposal remedies.   
Government price controls would largely defeat the approach of lower-
ing taxes to increase the base.  A central premise of lowering taxes is in-
creasing competition between the legal and illegal markets.  This effect in-
herently drives prices to the level where supply meets consumer demand, 
reducing the market’s current deadweight loss.  Shrinking the deadweight 
loss drives up the number of consumers purchasing legal retail marijuana, 
making the overall marketplace function more efficiently.  A greater num-
ber of consumers enables the government to collect similar revenue from 
more patrons than the present approach.  More consumers utilizing the legal 
market also results in fewer resources necessary to police the shrinking 
black market. 
Lowering the excise tax on recreational marijuana to expand the tax base 
satisfies both Rawls and Nozick.  It satisfies Rawls’s desire for a redistribu-
tive system aiding society’s worst off, but also appeases Nozick’s desire to 
decrease the role of government in the marketplace.204  Decreasing the ex-
cise tax also has the inherent advantage of increasing the market’s eco-
nomic efficiency.  First, lowering the taxes will lower the retail price retail-
ers charge.  This will encourage additional consumers to utilize the legal 
marketplace, which offers customers governmental protection policing the 
transactions and ensuring safety of the product being sold. 
Rawls acknowledges the societal problems of inequality, but his actual 
mechanism for solving those problems is inadequate.205  The taxation 
schemes Colorado and Washington use do not remedy inequality.206  The 
governments taxing marijuana in exchange for its decriminalization may 
satisfy Nozick, but further reducing the government’s role in the market-
place also conforms with Nozick’s libertarian beliefs.207  The proposal of 
																																																													
204 See supra text accompanying note 158, 167. 
205 See SMITH, supra note 159, at 187. 
206 See SMITH, supra note 159, at 187. 
207 “Taxation of earnings from labor is on par with forced labor.” NOZICK, supra note 166, at 262. 
(“Those who need to earn more money to satisfy their desires will have to pay more income tax which 
means that they will have to work more for purposes that others have set for them.”) BADER, supra note 
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lowering the tax rate does potentially appease both philosophies.   
A lower rate that creates an expanded base offers the state the potential 
for similar revenue.  This may appease Rawls’s desire for redistribution as 
the governments of Washington and Colorado now have additional money.  
The government is also then using fewer resources to address the shrinking 
black market.  How this newly generated money is used is the determining 
factor for Rawls.  In Colorado the first $40 million is earmarked for public 
school construction.208  This is a form of Rawlsian redistribution, potentially 
benefiting the least well off in society by providing benefits to all public 
school students in Colorado.  Rawlsian philosophy also welcomes the bene-
fits of government policed transactions being expanded to more individuals, 
now the least well off are not forced to the lawless black market in order to 
obtain the product affordably.  Instead, the least well off benefit from the 
redistribution occurring through government tax collection and also from a 
lower retail price, enabling more consumers to utilize the legal marketplace. 
Nozick’s libertarian viewpoint welcomes less government intrusion into 
the socially just free market.209  A lower tax rate helps restore all partici-
pant’s rightful entitlement to ownership, as the government takes less from 
each private transaction.  The lower rate also serves Nozick’s second goal 
of minimizing the role of the state.210  Less use of the state’s coercive taxing 
authority allows the supply and demand curves to more closely approach 
natural equilibrium.   Even though the state would generate similar amounts 
of revenue, appeasing Rawls by still being able to redistribute wealth, it 
would also satisfy Nozick’s desire to decrease the redistribution occurring 
in each transaction.    While the Nozickian utopia of minimal government 
interference is not perfectly achieved, a lower tax rate brings the status quo 
closer to his goal than the current system does.  Decreasing the marijuana 
excise taxes in Colorado and Washington potentially appeases the funda-
mental tenants of Rawls’s philosophy through revenue generation and dis-
tribution.  Nozick is satisfied through less state interference with private 
transactions and the expanding legal market resulting from the shrinking 
dead weight loss and the black market it feeds.   
																																																																																																																																													
166, at 55. 
208 Supra note 19, and accompanying text. 
209 NOZICK, supra note 167, at 113. 
210 NOZICK, supra note 167, at 118–19. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Colorado and Washington were trailblazers in legalizing recreational 
marijuana.  As such it is to be expected that its implementation would not 
be flawless.  The most important area for reform is the current tax system, 
because of its effects on each part of the interrelated marketplace.  Reduc-
ing marijuana excise taxes potentially decreases gross revenue as the cus-
tomer base expansion may not offset the rate reduction.  Net revenue ac-
crues from the rate reduction, however, may not be widely dissimilar from 
current tax collection levels, and potentially increased.  This comes from 
the accompanying reduction in the size of the black market which necessi-
tates fewer enforcement, prosecutorial, and judicial resources.  A more effi-
cient tax system helps create a more efficient marketplace, benefiting all le-
gal market participants. 	
